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In Defence of Higher-Order Musical 
Ontology: A Reply to Lee B. Brown
Andrew Kania
In a recent article in this journal, Lee B. Brown criticizes one central kind of project in higher-
order musical ontology—the project of offering an ontological theory of a particular musical 
tradition. I defend this kind of project by replying to Brown’s critique, arguing that musical 
practices are not untheorizably messy, and that a suitably subtle descriptivist ontology of a 
given practice can be valuable both theoretically and practically.
Musical ontologists study the kinds of musical things there are—works, performances, 
recordings, and so on—and the relationships that hold between them. I have argued 
that there is a useful distinction to be drawn between two projects in this field. ‘Funda-
mental’ musical ontology is the study of the basic metaphysical categories into which 
musical entities fall. (This project usually takes works and performances of Western 
classical music, more or less broadly construed, and more or less explicitly, as its tar-
get.) ‘Higher-order’ musical ontology asks questions that can be answered independ-
ently of a fundamental musical-ontological theory, such as what conditions must be 
met in order for a performance to be of a given work.1
In a recent article in this journal, Lee B. Brown criticizes one central kind of project 
in higher-order musical ontology—the project of offering an ontological theory of a 
particular musical tradition.2  So, for instance, Theodore Gracyk has argued that the 
work of art in rock music is a recording to be played back, rather than a song to be 
performed; Stephen Davies has argued that the same is true of the classical electronic 
tradition; I have argued that there are no works of art in jazz, only performances.3 
Brown characterizes such projects as attempts to answer the question ‘What is the 
work of art in X?’, where X is some particular musical tradition. He argues that, if we 
are descriptivists about musical ontology (and he seems to agree we should be), 
that is, if we think the main evidence to which ontological theories of music are 
beholden is musical practices, then there is no reason to think this question has an 
1  Andrew Kania, ‘New Waves in Musical Ontology’ in K. Stock and K. Thomson-Jones (eds), New Waves in Aesthetics 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 20–40. ‘Higher-order musical ontology’ is quite a mouthful, but acronymizing 
the phrase seems like a bad idea.
2  Lee B. Brown, ‘Do Higher-Order Music Ontologies Rest on a Mistake?’ BJA, 51 (2011), 169–184. All page 
references are to this piece unless otherwise noted.
3  Theodore Gracyk, Rhythm and Noise: An Aesthetics of Rock (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996); Stephen 
Davies, Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 25–34; Andrew 
Kania, ‘All Play and No Work: An Ontology of Jazz’, JAAC, 69 (2011), 391–403.
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answer.4  For, first, there is no reason to think, a priori, that any musical tradition should 
have a single, central concept of the work of art in that tradition. And, second, when we 
look, a posteriori, at any actual musical tradition (and the critical practice surrounding it), 
we see a messy diversity of people producing, appreciating, and critically discussing such 
things as songs, recordings, performances, and so on, in various ways, rather than the uni-
form practices a clean ontology would predict. Thus, the work of higher-order musical 
ontologists has been misguided. Ironically, given that their aim was to treat different mu-
sical traditions on their own terms, they have forced those very traditions into Procrustean 
ontological beds.5
I will attempt here to defend higher-order musical ontology from Brown’s arguments. 
Of course, my comments will reflect my own conception of the best goals and methods of 
higher-order musical ontology, about which there may be some disagreement. I will also 
use examples that reflect my particular views about various musical traditions. But my 
principal aim is to defend the field in general, not my particular views.
I agree with Brown that higher-order musical ontologists should not be guided unreflec-
tively by the question ‘What is the work of art in [a given musical tradition]?’ At the very 
least the question should be amended to ‘What is the work of art in [a given musical trad-
ition], if any?’6  Brown is clearly aware that higher-order musical ontologists make this quali-
fication, because one of his targets is my view that in ‘standard form’ jazz there are no 
works, only performances (175–179). What this suggests is that Brown thinks it is problem-
atic to go into musical ontology expecting to find any ontological structure at all that could 
be captured in a useful theory. For instance, he argues that James Young and Carl Matheson’s 
proposed ontology of jazz, which suggests jazz is fairly similar to classical music (ontologic-
ally), fits far more of jazz practice than my own view, but that it is similarly Procrustean in 
that there are many examples in and aspects of jazz practice that it does not fit (176–179).
Here is one vague, quasi-transcendental argument against the untheorizably messy 
nature of musical practices. Musical practices are sociocultural practices. This means that 
they rely on (often implicit) understandings shared by the participants in the practice. For 
instance, if there were not widespread agreement that novels ought to be read (rather than 
used as kindling) from the first page to that last (rather than in a random order), that they 
ought not to be taken as factual accounts, and so on, it is unlikely that people would spend 
so much time and effort producing such things with such uses in mind. Already in this brief 
sketch we can see the beginnings of an ontology of the novel. We have some evidence for 
4  For more on descriptivism in the ontology of art, see David Davies, Art as Performance (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2004), 16–24, and ‘The Primacy of Practice in the Ontology of Art’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67 (2009): 
159–71; and Andrew Kania, ‘The Methodology of Musical Ontology: Descriptivism and its Implications’, BJA 48 
(2008): 426–44.
5  Brown’s criticism is thus distinct from Lydia Goehr’s in The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, rev. edn (Oxford: 
OUP, 2007). Goehr’s point is that philosophers and musicians alike tend (or tended) to think of all music in 
ontological terms specific to (post-)Romantic Western classical music.
6  See, for example, ‘All Play and No Work’, 402-3, n. 55, where I criticize James O. Young and Carl Matheson, along 
with Garry Hagberg, for assuming there must be an answer to the first question.
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the fact that novels are linguistic structures, rather than concrete objects, because they are 
to be read rather than burned. However, experimental literary practices might be raised as 
counterexamples to any such ontology. Jonathan Safran Foer’s Tree of Codes (2010), for 
instance, cannot be properly understood or appreciated without taking centrally into ac-
count its physical manifestation as a book with parts of its pages cut out. But there are two 
obvious replies to such counterexamples, if they are aimed at showing that literary prac-
tices are untheorizably messy. First, to the extent that the work does not fit one’s ontology 
of the novel, one can deny it is literature. Unsurprisingly, much of the press that sur-
rounded the book’s release was concerned with its correct categorization. Second, in or-
der to understand the book properly, one must not only take into account aspects of it that 
one usually ignores when appreciating a novel, one must also take into account the fact that 
these features are non-standard. That is, understanding tradition-defying works requires understand-
ing the tradition, where that consists of standard practices. To return to musical ontology, 
the existence of jam bands, indeed the tradition of jam bands, might be considered a 
counterexample to an ontology of rock according to which recordings are the works of art 
in rock. But if one can tell a plausible historical story according to which this tradition is a 
reaction against the recording-centric nature of rock in general, one need not give up the 
general claim that the work of art in rock music is the recording. One might still make such 
a claim and offer a distinct ontology of the sub-tradition of jam bands that is more like, say, 
the ontology of jazz.7
Anyway, suppose we grant that there is no single, unqualified answer to ‘What is the 
work of art in [a given musical tradition]?’ It does not follow that there is no useful, best, 
perhaps qualified answer to that question. One thing that has to be resolved early on in any 
such enquiry is what concept of ‘work of art’ one is working with. I have followed others 
in taking it to refer, at least, to the kinds of things that are a primary focus of critical 
attention in a given tradition.8  Brown does not take issue with this conception; what 
he takes issue with is the idea that when we look at, say, the practice of rock music, we 
discover that there is some primary focus of critical attention.
One argument he gives is that since such concepts as the work of art in rock music ‘sim-
ply play no role in musical discourse, they constitute nothing to be either descriptivist 
or revisionary about. We know them only as inventions of the philosophers who conjure 
with them’ (181). This seems to me a misunderstanding of descriptivist methodology. A de-
scriptivist about properties, for instance, need not show that the concept of a trope is used 
in ordinary discourse about ordinary objects. She need only show that such a concept plays 
a role in the best theory of ordinary objects formulated under descriptivist constraints.
A second argument Brown gives is that when we look at rock practice, what we find is a range 
of different practices, and no settled primary focus in any of them (173–175, 178–179). I do 
not deny that we find a range of different practices within rock or jazz. In my own work, I 
7  I do not mean to suggest that I have such a plausible historical story to hand; I am merely attempting to defend the 
kinds of moves higher-order musical ontologists can make.
8  See, for example, Gracyk, Rhythm and Noise, 18, and Davies, Art as Performance, 50 et passim. I have also suggested that 
works of art are best conceived of as persisting objects (‘All Play and No Work’, 397–399), but I ignore that for 
now.
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have tried to limit the scope of the ontological theories I have offered of both rock and jazz to 
dominant sub-traditions within the broader traditions. I do deny, however, that we find no (rela-
tively) settled ontological structure (i.e. network of relations between pieces of music, 
performances, and recordings) within such sub-traditions.9  I have followed Theodore Gracyk, 
for instance, in arguing that the primary focus of critical attention in rock is the recording or 
track, rather than the song.10  Brown argues that even if we could get a very precise meas-
ure of critical attention, this would not warrant such a conclusion:
Suppose it could be shown that rock tracks get roughly seventy per cent of the critical 
attention devoted to rock music, with only thirty per cent devoted to songs. Not even 
this unbalanced mix would warrant the strange conclusion that the rock work is a 
track, not a song. (173)
Now, if the split were fifty–fifty, this would certainly be a strange conclusion. But, even in 
such an evenly split case, if we have not made the mistake of assuming that there must be 
a single primary focus of critical attention in a given tradition, then the correct conclu-
sion to draw would surely be that there are two primary foci of critical attention in the 
given tradition.11  When the split is seventy–thirty, it does not seem so strange to charac-
terize the first kind of thing, which is, after all, receiving over twice as much attention as 
the second, as the primary (though not sole) focus of critical attention. But this may be an un-
charitable response. Perhaps Brown’s point is that even if tracks are the primary focus of critical 
attention in this case, songs are still the focus of significant critical attention, as opposed to, say, 
the haircuts of the musicians, which, although not without a share of critical attention, even at-
tention that relates them to the music, would not count as significant in the same sense.12  If this 
9  One puzzling aspect of Brown’s essay is that he ends by praising Stephen Davies’s attempts to provide more 
fine-grained ontological theories of sub-traditions of Western classical music, after having criticized others’ attempts 
to do the same for sub-traditions of rock and jazz. He even says that it ‘is too bad . . . that Davies did not extend his 
willingness to diversify ontologically into the spheres of popular music that he addresses’ (184).
10  Brown misconstrues a few things I say as arguments against the workhood of rock songs: (i) that they are ‘manifested’,  
(ii) that they are thin, and (iii) that they are not for anything in particular. The thinness of rock songs does play a role in a 
kind of subsidiary argument—it seems unlikely that such thin items would be the primary focus of critical attention, with 
much richer items (namely, tracks) to hand—but this is not the central argument, and the other two are beside the point.
11   I have suggested just such a conclusion with respect to classical works and performances (‘All Play and No Work’, 
397-9).
12   Brown gives Tim Riley’s book Tell Me Why: A Beatles Commentary (New York: Knopf, 1988) as an example from a 
critical ‘literature [that] is full of studies of songs by the likes of Bob Dylan and Neil Young as songwriters no 
less than of songs by the Gershwins or Cole Porter’ (173). But it is clear from Riley’s introduction, and 
throughout his analyses, that he is discussing the Beatles’s recordings, not their songs considered as stand-alone 
pieces that could be interpreted in a range of performances. This is implicit in his critical analyses, when he 
discusses such elements of ‘Lady Madonna’ as ‘McCartney’s overt Presley imitation . . . a sassy Fats Domino 
piano figure gussied up with a natty horn section and flapper falsetto harmonies . . . [and t]he groove [that] 
dances all over the contradiction’ (247–248). But it is also explicit in Riley’s introduction, where he says that 
the Beatles ‘saw themselves first and foremost [one might as well say primarily] as recording artists, and their 
records still demonstrate all that pop can be’ (9). It is no argument against the Gracykian view that Riley also 
discusses, as I would say, thin songs manifested by these tracks.
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is the point, I grant it, but I do not see that it is damning to higher-order musical ontology. 
It seems more like a helpful contribution to the enterprise.13
If we grant that songs are a secondary, but significant, focus of critical attention in rock 
music, should we then call them works of art? Obviously, to some extent this is a merely 
verbal issue, but I also think we should choose our terms with care.14  Anyway, I take it 
Brown would not be happy if higher-order musical ontologists carried on doing exactly 
what they have been doing, but replaced the term ‘work of art’ with ‘schmork of art’. I thus 
ignore this issue as a red herring.
Brown thinks that if we give up on the idea that there must be a single primary focus of 
critical attention in a given tradition, then higher-order musical ontology is a waste of time 
(179–181). I do not see how this follows. But rather than diagnose the problem with the 
inference, I will instead point out what I take to be the central purposes of higher-order 
musical ontology. First, there is pure curiosity about a musical tradition one is interested 
in. Brown acknowledges this as a possible motivation, though he thinks the difficulty of 
getting the ontological theory right will outweigh the satisfaction of understanding 
(179–180). This seems a rather personal matter, but I should also point out that ‘understand-
ing’ here need not mean a purely intellectual exercise in taxonomy. One of the experi-
ences that set me on the path to being an ontologist of music was learning as an 
undergraduate about Gracyk’s ontology of rock. Having had a rather sheltered musical up-
bringing, I had some sympathy with formalist arguments for the superiority of classical 
music over rock. Discovering that I might well have been listening to the wrong thing 
when appreciating rock music (a work performance rather than a constructed track) ef-
fected a kind of Copernican revolution in my experience of the music. Such an experience 
would arguably be valuable even if the theory underpinning it were wrong (an idea I take 
succour from when having doubts about my own ontology of jazz); its value is undeniable 
if the theory is correct.
Second, answering ontological questions about a tradition can contribute to settling 
other kinds of debates within the tradition, such as debates over normative issues. It is dif-
ficult to give clear examples of this—rarely does either kind of debate seem to get settled 
definitively. But there does often seem to be progress in normative debates, and sometimes 
it comes about by being informed by ontological discussions. For instance, Brown claims 
that ‘the formerly heated controversy about “historical” or “original instrument” perform-
ances in European concert music . . . may have come close to being resolved, not by the 
efforts of higher-order ontologists, but by means of adjustments within practice’ (182). But 
these adjustments did not come about spontaneously; the controversy was a philosophical 
13   To move from considering primary to considering significant foci of critical attention need not be to step on to a 
slippery slope. There are many objects of critical attention in rock, for instance, other than tracks and songs—hooks, 
melodies, lyrics, ways of miking drums, etc.—but these can easily be distinguished in terms of their significance 
from tracks and songs. For one thing, their significance clearly derives (primarily!) from the contributions they make 
to tracks and songs.
14   See my ‘All Play and No Work’, 397–400, for some consideration of constraints on the use of ‘musical work’ as a 
theoretical term.
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debate, carried out not only in musical performances, but in conversations between musi-
cians and audiences, in programme booklets, and in the popular, musical, and academic 
presses. Professional philosophers contributed to this debate—or tried to, at least. They 
doubtless did not receive as much attention as they would have liked, but this does not 
show that they ought not to have received more attention.15  They were doubtless cor-
rect to point out problems with many of the arguments employed by others. This is not 
surprising—philosophers are trained to be sensitive to the kinds of conceptual distinctions 
(including ontological distinctions) that play a role in such debates.
Of course musical ontologists cannot and should not attempt to settle, all by themselves, 
debates such as that within jazz about whether the practice should be more compositional 
or improvisatory. Neither can or should Wynton Marsalis—one of Brown’s examples of a 
jazz theorist-practitioner. But obviously we should not (and cannot) exclude Wynton 
Marsalis from the conversation—he has very useful things to say about it. I would defend 
ontologists’ contributions in a similar way. Ontologists have tools for thinking about these 
questions that most other people (including most musicians) do not. Why not offer them 
as tools for interested parties’ use?16
I end with an analogy. Does it make sense to ask what the work of art is, in the sense of 
the primary focus of critical attention, in the artistic practice we call ‘film’ or ‘cinema’? It 
seems to me that it does, and that the answer is: the work of art in cinema is the film. There 
are certainly other kinds of objects in that practice that have artistic properties, and are 
studied more or less in their own right, e.g. screenplays. We thus might want to call screen-
plays works of art in some sense, though not in the sense outlined here. It may be that the 
evidence is clearer in the case of film than in rock or jazz. To put it in Brown’s tongue-
in-cheek terms, in the critical literature on film there is probably more like a 99–1 
split (if that) between work devoted to films and screenplays. But that is not a difference 
in principle between film and rock or jazz. I conclude that it at least makes sense to engage 
in higher-order musical ontology. I have suggested, further, that such engagement can be 
not only interesting, but also helpful to those invested in musical practice.17
Andrew Kania
Trinity University
akania@trinity.edu
15   That they received some attention is clear from perusing the references in musicological and music-critical writings 
on the subject. For a recent example, see Bruce Haynes, The End of Early Music: A Period Performer’s History of Music for 
the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: OUP, 2007).
16   To be fair, Brown does say that ‘there is no reason to dogmatize . . . about the matter’ of whether higher-order 
ontologists can contribute to debates within musical practice, though he is sceptical of the kind of ‘optimistic’ view  
I have defended here (181).
17   Thanks to Julie Post, Barry Weyburn, and, especially, Lee B. Brown for helpful discussion of these issues.
